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JVRXSPTCTIQN
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to Sections 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i), Utah Code Ann.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Is Summary Judgment the proper procedural vehicle

for a District Court to dispose of a petition for review of
a Board of Adjustment's decision, where there exist no
genuine issues of material fact, and the only matters to be
determined by the District Court are matters of law?

2.

Should Summary Judgment be upheld against

Plaintiffs/Petitioners who sued the wrong party?
3.

Should Summary Judgment be upheld against parties

who violated the statutory mandates regarding the scope of
the District Court's review of a Board of Adjustment's
record by introducing matters outside the record for the
District Court's consideration?
4.

Should Summary Judgment be upheld against parties

who failed to comply with their duty to marshall all
evidence in favor of the Board of Adjustment's decision
before challenging that decision?
5.

Should Summary Judgment be upheld against parties

who failed to carry their burden to demonstrate that the
Board of Adjustment's decision was so unreasonable as to be
arbitrary and capricious?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Section 10-9-707, Utah Code Ann, a copy of which

is attached as Exhibit A hereto.
2.

Section 10-9-708, Utah Code Ann,, a copy of which

is attached as Exhibit B hereto.
3.

Utah Rules pf Civil Procedure No. 56, a copy of

which is attached as Exhibit C hereto.
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STANDARD FQR REVIEW
Upon review of a grant of a Motion for Summary
Judgment, this Court gives no deference to the determination
of the District Court and reviews the Court's legal
conclusions for correctness.

State Landscaping and Snow

Removal v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, 844 P.2d
322 (Utah 1992) .
A grant of Summary Judgment should be affirmed on
appeal on any ground available to the District Court, even
if not relied on by the lower court. Higgins v. Salt Lake
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); Hill v. Seattle First
National Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992).
In determining whether a District Court's review of the
findings of a Board of Adjustment should be affirmed, this
Court is subject to an "arbitrary and capricious standard,"
i.e., unless no reasonable person could have come to the
conclusion that the Board did, the Board's decision must be
upheld. Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893
P.2d 602 (1995); National Bank of Boston v. County Board of
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners filed a "Petition for Review of
Administrative Decision" on February 28, 1995 in the Third
Judicial District Court.

[Record on Appeal (R.), 1 ] . In

that Petition, Petitioners claimed to be harmed by a
decision of the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City
Corporation rendered February 21, 1995.

Petitioners

requested that the Board of Adjustment's decision granting a
variance to Gastronomy, Inc., dba Market Street Broiler &
Fish Market and TTJ Partnership, relative to the placement
of a garbage dumpster, be vacated.
On March 22, 1995, Respondents filed an "Answer to
Petition for Review of Administrative Decision."

(R. 12).

Among the defenses asserted in that Answer were the
contentions that the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City
Corporation is not a proper Respondent.

The Answer also

asserted that the Board of Adjustment's decision was not
arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
On March 31, 1995, Petitioners filed a "Statement
Opting Out of ADR Program." (R. 18).
On April 11, 1995, Respondent Board of Adjustment of
Salt Lake City Corporation filed a Motion for Summary

4

Judgment, with accompanying Points and Authorities attached
thereto. (R. 28). Attached as Exhibit A to the Points and
Authorities was a copy of the Board of Adjustment's
"Findings and Order." (R. 37). On April 9, 1995,
Respondents supplemented the Memorandum in Support of the
Motion for Summary Judgment by the attachment of a copy of a
verbatim transcript of the Board of Adjustment's proceedings
upon which the "Findings and Order" were based. (R. 4 4 ) .
On August 28, 1995, Petitioners filed a "Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment," which they also
denominated as a "Brief on Appeal." (R. 81). Attached to
that Memorandum were eight exhibits, of which five exhibits
had never been presented to the Board of Adjustment nor
referenced in its Findings and Order or any other part of
the record for the case upon which Petitioners' Petition was
based. (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 ) .
On October 9, 1995, Respondents filed a "Reply in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," (R. 113), in which
Petitioners objected to Respondents' improper attempt to
supplement the record beyond the minutes, findings and
orders of the Board which constitute the only records
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sanctioned under statute.

See Section 10-9-708(4), Utah

Code Ann.
On November 1, 1995, Petitioners filed a "Reply Brief,"
as well as a "Notice to Submit for Decision." (R. 143).
Respondents objected to the filing of Petitioners'
"Reply Brief," on November 3, 1995, on the basis that under
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration, no "Reply
Brief" was allowed. (R. 13 9).
On November 16, 1995, Petitioners filed a "Response to
Objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief." (R. 145).
On January 29, 1996, the District Court held the first
of two hearings on this matter.

During the course of that

hearing, the Court directed counsel for Respondents to
supplement the record with a copy of the Board of
Adjustment's entire file on Case No. 2150-B, the underlying
case upon which the action was predicated, as well as an
affidavit from a representative of the Board of Adjustment
that such constituted the Board's entire file.

The Court

did so in order to determine whether the five exhibits
attached to Petitioners' "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment" to which Respondents had objected were
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either presented to or considered by the Board of Adjustment
in connection with Case No. 2150-B.
On February 7, 1996, Respondents complied with the
District Court's direction, filing a "Second Supplement to
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment." (R.
167).

Accompanying that "Second Supplement" was an

Affidavit from Merrill L. Nelson, the Salt Lake City Board
of Adjustment Administrator, as well as a copy of the Board
of Adjustment's entire file on Case No. 2150-B. (R. 171).
Mr. Nelson's Affidavit confirmed that the five objected-to
exhibits presented by Petitioners to the Court were neither
filed with nor considered by the Board of Adjustment in
making its decision on Case No. 2150-B.
On February 27, 1996, Petitioners filed an "Objection
to Portions of the Affidavit of Merrill L. Nelson,"
objecting specifically to his use of the word "consider" in
connection with the Board's deliberations on Case No. 2150B. (R. 243).
On March 7, 1996, Respondents replied to Petitioners'
"Objection." (R. 240).
A second hearing on this matter was held on March 11,
1996.

At the conclusion of oral arguments, the Court ruled

7

from the bench, granting Respondents1 Motion for Summary
Judgment.
An Order Granting Summary Judgment was entered April 5,
1996. (R. 257).
Petitioners appealed to this Court on May 6, 1996.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Market Street Broiler, a restaurant located at 258
South 13 00 East, applied to the Salt Lake City Board of
Adjustment for a variance allowing a double garbage dumpster
enclosure, without providing the required rear yard
landscaped buffer in a B-3/CN Historic Zone abutting an R3A/RMF-30 zone. [Findings and Order (F. & 0), p.l] (R. 37).
A hearing on the application, denominated Case No.
2150-B, was heard before the Board of Adjustment on January
30, 1995.

Present for Market Street Broiler were John

Williams, co-owner of the restaurant, Judy Reese and Lonnie
Foster.

Opposing the restaurant's application were Pamela

Wells and Rosemary Emery, two of the Petitioners/Appellants
herein, as well as Linda LePreau, Petitioners/Appellants1
attorney.

These persons opposing the application were

residents whose homes were near the restaurant (F. & 0. pp.
1 - 2, 4)(R. 37 - 38, 40). The hearing was recorded, from
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which a verbatim transcript was prepared.

[Transcript (T.),

pp. 1 - 37] (R. 44).
At the hearing, the Board took evidence that the area
proposed by Market Street Broiler for enclosure was already
being used for outside dumpsters, and had been for at least
10 years.

(F. & 0 . , p.l [R. 37]; T., p.3 [R. 46]).

The

Board further heard evidence that large dumpsters to be
placed in the enclosure were necessary to handle the amount
of trash produced by Market Street Broiler, and that
sufficient space to contain the dumpsters did not exist
inside the building.

(F.& 0., p.l [R. 37]; T., pp.3-5 [R.

46 - 48]). The Board heard evidence that Market Street
Broiler was unable to provide a buffer in the parking lot
because Market Street Broiler did not own the land upon
which the parking lot was located.

(F.& 0., pp. 1 - 2

[R.

37 - 38]; T., p. 7 [R. 50]). Furthermore, the Board was
presented with evidence that a "buffer" of sorts existed
between the Market Street Broiler and the residential
properties by means of an alleyway that is kept clear for
vehicular traffic.

(F.& 0., pp. 1 - 2

[R. 37 - 38]; T., pp.

27 - 28 [R. 70 - 71]). The Board also heard evidence that
the use of the dumpsters in their present location preceded
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the adoption of the master plan defining the rear yard
landscape buffer in a B3(CN) historic zone abutting an R3A(RMF-30) zone.

(F. & 0., p. 1 [R. 37]; T. , pp. 3 - 5 [R.

46 - 48] ) .
After a full hearing, the Board granted the
application, with the proviso that Market Street Broiler
should work with staff members of Salt Lake City Corporation
"to locate the enclosure as close as possible to the rear of
the building in order that the available land between the
enclosure and the rear property line may be landscaped in a
manner that will provide an adequate buffer."

(F. & 0., p.

4 [R. 40] ) .
Petitioners filed a "Petition for Review of
Administrative Decision" with the District Court shortly
thereafter.

(See "Statement of The Case," supra).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Summary Judgment is the proper procedural vehicle

for a District Court to dispose of a petition for review of
a Board of Adjustment's decision.

Where the District Court

is statutorily restricted in its review to the Board of
Adjustment's record, there can exist no genuine issues of
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material fact, and thus the only matters to be determined by
the District Court are matters of law.
2.

Summary Judgment should be upheld when several

grounds existed upon which the lower court was justified in
granting it.

In the instant case, at least four independent

bases for the District Court's disposition of this case by
means of Summary Judgment exist:
A.

Summary Judgment should be upheld because

Petitioners sued the wrong party.
B.

Summary Judgment should be upheld because

Petitioners violated the statutory mandates regarding the
scope of the District Court's review of a Board of
Adjustment's record.

Here, Petitioners introduced documents

outside the Board of Adjustment's record and then relied on
those documents in arguing that the Board's decision should
have been overturned.
C.

Summary Judgment be upheld because Petitioners

failed to comply with their duty to marshall all evidence in
favor of the Board of Adjustment's decision before
challenging that decision.
D.

Summary Judgment should be upheld because

Petitioners failed to carry their burden to demonstrate that
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the Board of Adjustment's decision was so unreasonable as to
be arbitrary and capricious.
ARGUMENT
I.
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY
MEANS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER.
Petitioners acknowledge that "District Courts typically
dispose of appeals from decisions of administrative agencies
on defendants' motions to affirm or motions for summary
judgment." (Petitioners' Opening Brief, p. 17).
Nonetheless, Petitioners argue, Summary Judgment is not the
proper means for dismissal of this case, because the Summary
Judgment procedure fails to allow the Petitioners to get in
the "last word" by way of a Reply Brief.
Petitioners never objected to the procedure of
resolving this case by means of Summary Judgment before the
District Court.

They did argue that the Court should

consider a "Reply Brief" they filed as part of their
"appeal" of the Board of Adjustment's actions, however.
(Petitioners' "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment" was also denominated a "Brief On Appeal"
as well).
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In any case, Petitioners now assert that Summary Judgment
is not a proper method for disposing of the case,
notwithstanding that they agree that there exist no genuine
issues of material fact, and that the only issues to be
determined by the court are issues of law.
Petitioners cite no case law or statutes from Utah in
support of their proposition, preferring instead to refer the
Court to cases from other jurisdictions in which the Utah
legislative scheme in dealing with land use matters does not
apply.
Neither the Utah statutory scheme, Utah case law nor plain
logic stand for the proposition that Summary Judgment is an
inappropriate method for handling appeals from Board of
Adjustment decisions, however.

Quite the opposite is true.1

"'"Utah case law affirms the principle that Summary Judgment is the appropriate
mechanism for determining an appeal from a Board of Adjustment decision. In Sandy City
v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court upheld a District
Court's grant of Summary Judgment in a case involving an appeal from an administrative
land use decision of the Salt Lake County Commission. In so doing, this Court applied
the principle that on appeal from a city's Board of Adjustment's decision, the Board's
determination was due substantial deference under the mandates of the statutes and case
law relative to such boards. Thus, Summary Judgment was appropriate.
That decision was reviewed and reversed in part by the Utah Supreme Court on a writ
of certiorari in Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992). The technical
grounds for the Supreme Court's partial reversal of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision
are only peripherally pertinent to this case. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court
of Appeals' reading of the statutes relevant to city Boards of Adjustment. That Court
held that those statutes were not relevant to the case, however, because they do not apply
to counties. Id. at 219. Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals had
applied a correct, but inapplicable, standard.
What is relevant to this case is that both Courts agreed that Summary Judgment is a
proper mechanism for disposing of appeals from land-use decisions from a city Board of
Adjustment under proper circumstances. Those circumstances exist in this case.
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It should be obvious that Summary Judgment is a proper,
if not even preferred, mechanism for a District Court to
dispose of the issues placed before it in an administrative
zoning appeal matter.

Where a District Court is restricted

to a review of the administrative record, it can hardly be
argued that genuine issues of material fact will exist with
regard to that record.

The record will speak for itself,

and the only question with regard thereto is whether no
reasonable person could have decided as the Board of
Adjustment did.

(See discussion in Point 11(D), infra).

This issue, of course, is by definition a matter of law.
(This point was apparently conceded at the outset of this
case by Petitioners when they filed a Statement opting out
of the ADR program.

It makes little sense to opt for

alternative dispute resolution when the only dispute is a
matter of law which should be determined by the appropriate
Court).
Thus, the important issue is not which party has a
chance at putting in the last word, but rather which party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Summary

Judgment is the perfect vehicle for making that
determination.

(Of course, had Petitioners been interested
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in getting "last word" before the District Court in a proper
procedural context, they could have filed a Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment after the filing of Respondents' Motion for
Summary Judgment, and thus filed the final Reply in support
of the Cross-Motion).
In the instant case, the District Court's use of
Summary Judgment as the procedural mechanism by which to
dismiss the case was proper and appropriate.

It should be

upheld by this Court.

II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD ON ANY
OF THE SEVERAL GROUNDS DEMONSTRATED IN
THE LOWER COURT.
Where there exists any reasonable basis upon which a
District Court's judgment may be upheld on appeal, the
judgment should be upheld. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County.
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993), citing Hill vs. Seattle First
National Bank. 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992) (a grant of
Summary Judgment may be affirmed on appeal on any ground
available to the lower court, even if not relied on in the
lower court).
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In the instant case, the District Court did not set
forth the specific grounds upon which Summary Judgment was
granted.

As pointed out below, several grounds exist upon

which the lower court may have granted Summary Judgment, any
one of which constitutes an adequate basis for this Court to
uphold that judgment.

Thus, this Court may, and should,

uphold the grant of Summary Judgment on any or all of the
grounds upon which the lower court's decision may have been
based.
A.
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD BECAUSE
PETITIONERS SUED THE WRONG PARTY.
The named Respondent, Salt Lake City Board of
Adjustment, is not an entity that has the capacity to sue or
be sued.

In fact, it has no independent existence outside

Salt Lake City Corporation, of which it is a division.

Salt

Lake City Corporation, the proper party defendant, has never
been named as a party.
Petitioners have never disputed this fact.

Instead,

Petitioners simply ignored the fact that they have sued the
wrong party.

They did not seek to either amend their

Complaint or to dismiss the Complaint and refile against the
proper Respondent.
16

Because Petitioners sued the wrong entity, their case
was properly dismissed.
B.
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD
BECAUSE PETITIONERS INAPPROPRIATELY
INTRODUCED MATTERS OUTSIDE THE RECORD
FOR THE COURT'S CONSIDERATION.
The minutes, findings and orders of a board of
adjustment constitute the entire record upon which a
District Court may determine whether a petition for relief
from the board 1 s decision may be granted.

Section 10-9-

708(4), Utah Code Annptatefl. See also Xanthos v. Board of
Adjustment. 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984).
In the instant case, Petitioners impermissibly
supplemented the record with five "exhibits" that were not
part of the record.

Petitioners1 recitation of "facts" to

the District Court, as well as their arguments based on
those facts, were based in large part on the "evidence"
found in these "exhibits."

As it turns out, the five

"exhibits" were never presented to nor considered by the
Board of Adjustment with regard to Case No. 2150-B, the case
upon which Petitioners1 Petition was based.
Petitioners blatantly and deliberately infected the
proceedings with matters outside the scope of the District
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Court's proper purview in clear violation of statute.

After

Respondents objected to Petitioners1 improper actions,
additional briefing and an additional court hearing
confirmed that Petitioners had indeed acted inappropriately
by attempting to "salt" the record with "exhibits" that
should never have made their way into court.
Petitioners' arguments to the District Court as to the
merits of their case were fundamentally based on "evidence"
contained in the impermissible "exhibits." As presented to
the District Court, Petitioners' case could not be logically
analyzed without reference to the "evidence" which did not
form part of the record to which the District Court (and
this Court) must limit its review.

Petitioners' argument

and the supplemental "exhibits" were inextricably linked.
See Petitioners' "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment." (R. 81).
Without these impermissible "exhibits," Petitioners had
no legal or logical leg to stand on.

(In fact, even

the exhibits, Petitioners' case was meritless).

with

The Court's

grant of the motion for Summary Judgment was thus proper
under these circumstances.
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c.
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD
BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO MEET THEIR
BURDEN OF MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE.
The "marshaLling" requirements for a petitioner in the
context of challenging a determination of the Board of
Adjustment is set forth in Heinecke v. Department of
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991):
Heinecke argues adamantly, and at
great length, that the division's
findings generally are not supported by
substantial evidence. He fails,
however, to point out exactly which
findings are unsupported by substantial
evidence, and how the evidence is

insufficient. To successfully
challenge
such findings on judicial
review of
administrative
action, a party must
demonstrate that the findings are "not
supported by substantial
evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record
before
the court.'1
Utah Code Annotated
§63-46B-16(4) (g) (1989) ; Grace Drilling
v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68
(Utah App. 1989). In order to do this,
a party must marshall the evidence,
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68, i.e., it

"must marshall the evidence in support
of the findings and then
demonstrate
that despite this evidence,
the . . .
findings are so lacking in support11 as
to be inadequate under the
applicable
standard of review.
Mountain States Broadcasting Company v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551,
553 (Utah App. 1989).

(Emphasis added).
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Petitioners failed completely to marshall the evidence
in support of the board's findings before the District
Court, a necessary requisite to prosecuting their case.
They have also failed to marshall this evidence before this
Court.

At no point have Petitioners pointed to any evidence

that would support the Board's findings.
Petitioners' failure to marshall the evidence in
support of the Board's decision was, in

and of

itself,

enough of a basis for the District Court to deny
Petitioners' petition and to grant Summary Judgment in
City's favor.

It stands as an adequate basis for this Court

to uphold that judgment.
D.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE UPHELD BECAUSE PETITIONERS FAILED
TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT THE BOARD"S DECISION WAS SO
UNREASONABLE AS TO BE ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS.
In challenging the Board of Adjustment's decision, a
petitioner "may only allege that the Board of Adjustment's
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."
17-27-708(2), Utah Code Annotated.

Section

In order to show that a

Board of Adjustment has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, a
petitioner must demonstrate that no reasonable person could
20

have concluded as this board did.

"[W]e must simply

determine, in light of the evidence before the board,
whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as
the board.
anew."

It is not our prerogative to weigh the evidence

Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment. 893

P.2d 602, 604 (1995) .

This difficult requirement presents a

heavy burden on a petitioner. Thus, as summarized by this
Court in the Patterson case, "the Board f s actions are
accorded substantial deference and will be rejected on
appeal only if they are so unreasonable as to be arbitrary
and capricious or if they violate the law.

The reason for

this lies in the substantial discretion granted boards of
adjustment."

id. at 603.

A reviewing court is under a duty to presume that a
Board of Adjustment has acted correctly and properly.

As

the Utah Supreme Court stated in Thurston v. Cache County.
626 P.2d 440 (1981), "the [board] is afforded broad latitude

of discretion, and its
presumption

of validity."

decisions

are afforded

a

strong

I&. at 445 (emphasis added).

Thus, as the Patterson court concluded:
Accordingly, we will not substitute our
judgment on matters of public policy
normally left to the board's discretion;
we will simply insure that the board
21

proceeds within the limits of fairness
and justice and acts in good faith to
achieve permissible ends. The board
will be found to have exercised its
discretion within the proper boundaries
unless its decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
Patterson. 893 P.2d at 604.
Petitioners1 broadside attack on the Board's decision
failed to demonstrate that the Board's decision was so
unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious, and that no
reasonable person could have so decided.
Petitioners argued to the District Court that because
the Board did not make specific findings on each of the
criteria set forth in Section 10-9-707(2)(a), Utah Code
Annotated, by definition, its decision somehow could not be
justified.

In particular, Petitioners argued that because

the Board did not use the magical terms "unreasonable
hardship" and "special circumstances" in its findings, the
Board's decision must not have complied with statute.

They

have reiterated those arguments before this Court.
Petitioners were plainly wrong below and are plainly
wrong here.

There is no requirement in the statutes that a

Board of Adjustment make specific findings relative to each
of the statutory criteria.

The statutes are equally bereft
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of any requirement that the terms "unreasonable hardship"
and "special circumstances" must be used.

Rather, the broad

standards enunciated by the courts require only that "the
board proceeds within the limits of fairness and justice and
acts in good faith to achieve permissible ends."

Patterson.

supra, at 604.
In the instant case, had Petitioners marshalled the
evidence in support of the Board's decision as they were
required to do, they would have discovered that the evidence
upon which the Board relied complies with all necessary
statutory criteria, including "unreasonable hardship" and
"special circumstances."
As pointed out above, evidence presented to the Board
demonstrated that the area proposed by Market Street Broiler
for enclosure was already being used for outside dumpsters,
and had been for at least 10 years.

Furthermore, large

dumpsters to be placed in the enclosure were necessary to
handle the amount of trash produced by Market Street
Broiler.

Sufficient space to contain the dumpsters did not

exist inside the building.

The evidence showed that Market

Street Broiler was unable to provide a buffer in the parking
lot because Market Street Broiler did not own the land upon
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which the parking lot was located.

In addition, the evidence

showed that a "buffer" of sorts already existed between the
Market Street Broiler and the residential properties by means
of an alleyway that is kept clear for vehicular traffic. The
evidence also demonstrated that the use of the dumpsters in
their present location had long preceded the adoption of the
master plan defining the rear yard landscape buffer in a B3(CN)
historic zone abutting an R3-A(RMF-30) zone.
Given these facts, it cannot be said that no reasonable
mind could agree with the Board that a variance was justified
or that the Board's findings were inconsistent with statutory
criteria.

There existed substantial evidence of "unreasonable

hardship," "special circumstances," and all other statutory
requirements for the granting of a variance.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Summary Judgment
issued in Respondents1 favor should be upheld, and the judgment
affirmed on appeal.
DATED this *i

—

day of October, 1996.

XiPnMiWMMZk-^

Ranqall K. Edwards
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Respondent Salt Lake City
Board of Adjustment
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EXHIBIT A

10-9-707. Variances.
(1) Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of
the requirements of the zoning ordinance as applied to a
parcel of property that he owns, leases, or in which he holds
some other beneficial interest may apply to the board of
adjustment for a variance from the terms of the zoning
ordinance.
(2) (a) The board of adjustment may grant a variance only
if:
(i) literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance
would cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not necessary to carry out the general
purpose of the zoning ordinance;
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the
property that do not generally apply to other properties in the same district;
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by
other property in the same district;
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the
general plan and will not be contrary to the public
interest; and
(v) the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed
and substantial justice done.
(b) (i) In determining whether or not enforcement of
the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable
hardship under Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjustment may not find an unreasonable hardship unless
the alleged hardship:
(A) is located on or associated with the property for which the variance is sought; and
(B) comes from circumstances peculiar to the
property, not from conditions that are general to
the neighborhood.
(ii) In determining whether or not enforcement of
the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable
hardship under Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjustment may not find an unreasonable hardship if the
hardship is self-imposed or economic.
(c) In determining whether or not there are special
circumstances attached to the property under Subsection
(2)(a), the board of adjustment may find that special
circumstances exist only if the special circumstances:
(i) relate to the hardship complained of; and
(ii) deprive the property of privileges granted to
other properties in the same district.
(3) The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all
of the conditions justifying a variance have been met.
(4) Variances run with the land.
(5) The board of adjustment and any other body may not
grant use variances.
(6) In granting a variance, the board of adjustment may
impose additional requirements on the applicant that will:
(a) mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or
(b) serve the purpose of the standard or requirement
that is waived or modified.
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EXHIBIT B

10-9-708. District court review of board of adjustment
decision.
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board
of adjustment may petition the district court for a review of
the decision.
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege that the
board of adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.

CQ

(3) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days ^
after the board of adjustment's decision is
final.
£j

(4) (a) The board of adjustment shall transmit to the re- g
viewing court the record of its proceedings including its ><
minutes, findings, orders and, if available, a true and
correct transcript of its proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of
that tape recording is a true and correct transcript for
purposes of this subsection.
(5) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is
limited to the record provided by the board of actfustment.
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any
evidence outside the board of adjustment's record
unless that evidence was offered to the board of
adjustment and the court determines that it was
improperly excluded by the board of adjustment,
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses
and take evidence.
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the board of
adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
(7) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of
the board of adjustment.
(b) (i) Before filing the petition, the aggrieved party
may petition the board of adjustment to stay its
decision.
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the board of
adjustment may order its decision stayed pending
district court review if the board of adjustment finds
it to be in the best interest of the municipality.
(iii) After the petition is filed the petitioner may
seek an injunction staying the board of adjustment's
decision.
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EXHIBIT C

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as
to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered .
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga- CJ
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if =
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ^
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a H
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in charac- H
ter, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although ffi
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
^
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial
shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's
fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged
guilty of contempt.

